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Attachment and doubt in the work of Stanley Cavell





In his autobiography, Little Did I Know, the Harvard philosopher Stanley Cavell traces the roots of his philosophical approach to his childhood, examining what he had to learn to make sense of his father’s anger at the world and at him. Cavell describes the huge shadow his father cast over his work, even as Cavell himself achieved success in an academic sphere “quite beyond comprehension” for his uneducated father (Little Did I Know, p.356). This chapter will begin by considering Cavell’s account of his relationship with his father, and what it was that he learnt about doubt and acknowledgement in making sense of his father’s hate. The next section will outline the main current of Cavell’s philosophical work: his thinking about what is at stake in scepticism regarding the pain of others. The powerful implications of his reflections on this issue will then be demonstrated through attention to Cavell’s work on Shakespeare, with particular attention to themes of attachment and doubt in King Lear. 

He is as alone as I am

Cavell is known as a philosopher of the analytic tradition, a branch of philosophy that focuses largely on questions of how to achieve surety regarding truth or moral judgement. Yet his first love was music. As a teenager, Cavell played alto saxophone as the sole white member of a black jazz band in Sacramento, California (earning more money per week as a musician than his father’s pawnshop, Pitch of Philosophy, p.24). He used the name Stanley Cavell as a stage name, and aged 16, legally changed his surname from Goldstein. Later, he majored in music at the University of California, Berkeley, before beginning studies in composition at the Juilliard School of Music in New York. However he found himself unable to work, and was drawn instead to reading Freud and works of philosophy in the library. In his autobiography Cavell describes a powerful feeling he had during this time in his life – a feeling that he was falling apart. The experiences of his childhood, which had made him who he was, were now also undoing him. The turn from music to philosophy was made in the context of a period of receiving psychoanalytic psychotherapy, seeking recovery from great inner pain. The insights that Cavell found in psychotherapy led him to serious exploration as to whether he should train as a psychoanalyst, though ultimately he brought these insights to academic philosophy. This is important for understanding Cavell’s unusual approach as a philosopher. 

In Little Did I Know (p.457-8), Cavell would describe the political conditions in Austria and Germany in the years during the rise of National Socialism that fed his focus on analytic philosophy, transplanting it into Anglophone academia wherein he was continually in search of certainties and avoiding errors of thought. 

An influential exemplar of the analytic project is Bertrand Russell’s theory of descriptions which evaluates statements using a logical procedure to demonstrate whether they reference the world correctly or in error. As a young man, Cavell entered this analytic philosophical tradition, despite the fact that it had little place – at least at the time – for considering the inevitabilities and logic of error and loss, and what we do after experiencing either or both. Yet he found, or made a space within this tradition, for his own philosophical thoughts. He came to see in ordinary language philosophy (Wittgenstein and Austin) and American transcendentalism (Emerson and Thoreau) good, supportive forebears of his own direction of reflection. Cavell gave particular attention to passages where these thinkers write about the inevitability of imperfection, of incompleteness, and he considered their reflections on the different ways we might respond to this inevitability. 

In his autobiography, Cavell details the roots of his work as a philosopher in his experiences as a child. In particular, he gives central place to his father, an immigrant Jew from Eastern Europe enraged by the daily battles of living in a society that made him feel out of place and by a family that was unable to offer respite from this feeling. Cavell relates the moment that he recalls knowing for sure that his father hated him. It was 1933, during the Depression. After a failed business venture, the family had needed to downside and so they moved to a new apartment. Cavell was six years old at the time of the move. He describes wandering around in the new apartment, trying to take an interest in the combination of familiar furniture and the unfamiliar space of the unlit living room. Cavell reports noticing a bowl and lifting off the lid, to find it filled with small chocolate wafers, one of his favourite treats. Only then does he realise that his father is standing silently in the semi-darkness on the other side of the room:
As I took one of the speckled wafers from the purple bowl, I said aimlessly, but somehow to break the silence with my father, “I didn’t know we had these here.” He lurched at me, wrenched the dome top and the wafer out of my hands, and said in a violent, growling whisper, “And you still don’t know it!” (Little Did I Know, p.19)

Cavell reports that this is his first memory of ever being alone in a room with his father. He describes the moment as one of certainty for him: utter conviction that his father wanted him dead. In considering this quality in the father-son relationship, Cavell reports that “from as early as I can recall, it seemed less that my hatred was caused by his famous temper than that my sense of distance from him or ignorance of him was the cause of his rage at me.” (p.19)

Just as his father’s anger cast a large shadow over his development, even as a child Cavell sensed that in turn there was some shadow that he was casting over his father: 
When later in my bedroom at the back of the new apartment I found a time and place to release my state of numbness and to cry uncontrollably, I seemed to find I was crying for my father as much as for myself, crying over whatever it was that had left this man bereft and incoherent. He is as alone as I am… It is as if I knew then that I would one day find a way out of the devastation he could make of his island, and knew that such a day would never come for him (Don’t tell me no man is an island.) Not of course that I escaped it entirely, but I have made headway. (p.20)

Cavell situates his work as a philosopher firmly in the context of what he learned, what he had to learn, in trying to make sense of his father’s anger and survive within a family utterly shaped by its presence. 

Philosophers had made it seem like doubt about the reality of the world or other people was a problem that could be solved through finding the right method for finding certainties. discussed doubt regarding the external world, and of other minds as problems to be solved through finding the correct method for knowing with certainty against all future contingency, along (an idealised) model of scientific knowledge about physical phenomena. However, the whole question seemed misconceived to Cavell. After growing up within a family environment coloured by his father’s rages and despair, he was acutely aware not only of the role of limits on knowledge of others but also how unbearable what we already know about others can be:
How could I have failed to be suspicious, no matter how many years later, when I found philosophers asking such questions as, “Do I know your pain the way you do?” My principal problem was not that of doubting my knowledge of the feelings of others but rather of standing apart from them, or failing to. Not to know them would require exorcism. (Little Did I Know, p.19-20)

Whereas analytic philosophy conventionally sets out to avoid the spectre of doubt and find a way to certainty through correct procedure, Cavell learnt that some certainties could have their own appalling spectre, for which doubt would be a relief. Some examples of certainty that Cavell offers in an ostensibly non-autobiographical text, Disowning Knowledge, are nonetheless revealing: Cavell proposes that I am as certain that I am unable to change the outcome of a performance of King Lear except by interrupting it as I am that “I cannot choose the contents of my dreams or suffer my daughter’s pain or alter my father’s childhood” (Disowning Knowledge, p.90). Theatre, dreams, parenting, and being a child can have a similar kind of certainty, despite their variedness as domains of experience, since in each the terms of what we mean to others are foregrounded. Cavell was intensely aware of the social conditions of being recognisable and acknowledged by others, and felt that in any case of genuine moral or existential significance there could be no single protocol to find the single right answer - as most analytic philosophy would wish. He argues that learning how others decide whether we are worth understanding is something every child must face: 
"My meaning anything, my making sense, depends upon others' finding me worth understanding, as if they might just decide that I am without sense. Childhood is lived under this threat. It is no wonder Melanie Klein describes the child’s world as hedged with madness, negotiating melancholy for paranoia, reparation for destructiveness” (Day after Tomorrow, p.264). 

Across his autobiography, Cavell examines the influence of both his parents, but above all his father, on his experience and choices, his drive and his errors, his wish for and fears of recognition. In this relationship with the figure and then memory of his father, Cavell documents ongoing moments of difficulty, but also some moments of repair. For instance, the day after the defence of his doctoral dissertation at Harvard, he returned briefly to see his parents in Atlanta. His father surprised him by offering to pay to outfit Cavell in a PhD robe in Harvard colours. Cavell surprised himself by accepting: “It was a private ceremony in a process of forgiving each other, to whatever extent coloured by insincerity, yet clear and not without immediate effectiveness. Ceremony in human existence is no more measurable by its utility, though philosophers sometimes seem to argue otherwise, than the possession of language is”. This is demonstrated, both in literature and in life, by “the role of ceremony in the lives of creatures vulnerable to tragedy and madness (shown in King Lear as the consequences of the perversion or negation of ceremony).” (Little Did I Know, 15-16). In offering Cavell this ceremony of acknowledgement, some connection and repair was achieved both despite and because of the fact that father and son knew that the distance between them ultimately remained. The mutual understanding of this fact, combined with the gesture of the father’s offering and the son’s acceptance of the fitting, permitted an interaction that gained its generosity through the doubts felt by each for their relationship with the other.  

Do I know your pain the way you do?

In philosophy, the problem of sceptical doubt has two dimensions. A first is object scepticism: how do I know that anything in the external world is real? A second dimension is scepticism regarding other minds: how do I know that you have experience like mine? In the Philosophical Investigations (§253), Wittgenstein asks whether these two problems are like or unlike one another:
"Another person can't have my pains."—Which are my pains? What counts as a criterion of identity here? Consider what makes it possible in the case of physical objects to speak of "two exactly the same", for example, to say "This chair is not the one you saw here yesterday, but is exactly the same as it".

In his magnum opus The Claim of Reason, Cavell’s great concern is this comparison in Wittgenstein between object scepticism and scepticism regarding other minds. In the course of his reflections, Cavell comes to the conclusion that though the two may have a similar formulation, they are actually radically different in how we actually go about living our lives. Their social meaning is largely different, in large part because knowing about facts is only a small part of what we spend our time doing. When someone tells us “I am in pain”, except in particular specialist medical contexts it is rare that they are making a statement pointing to a specific inner object. More often they are making a claim on us that may be acknowledged or not acknowledged and in doing so puts our relationship with the speaker into question – and this includes in the medical context as well. The more general point, for Cavell, is that the contexts of the two forms of scepticism differ substantially. Object scepticism is something that appears on particular occasions, within a sea of everyday certainty. For instance we may meaningfully ask “Is this really a biscuit?” in the specific context of a legal case about tax payable on chocolate-covered biscuits but not on chocolate-covered cakes (e.g. United Biscuits (UK) Ltd (No 2) (LON/91/160) VAT Decision 634 on the classification of Jaffa Cakes). This question then has some purpose, and criteria can be drawn up and debated, and then used to support or contest a decision. However, to ask the question “Is this really a biscuit?” without such context is to end up freewheeling, to lose contact with the ground and friction of meanings provided by everyday life and its ordinary demands. 

However, this situation stands in stark contrast to scepticism regarding other minds. Rather than the exception as with objects, it is the rule that we find ourselves considering and weighing and worrying about our perceptions of what others are experiencing. Most of our days are taken up with this activity. One example is considering, weighing and worrying about the suffering of others – or the variety of activities we use to avoid engaging or being open to the pain of others. “For me to know your pain”, Cavell writes, 
“I cannot locate it as I locate mine, but I must let it happen to me. My knowledge of you marks me… My knowledge of myself is something I find, as on a successful quest; my knowledge of others, of their separateness from me, is something that finds me. I might say that I must let it make an impression upon me” (Remarks on ‘Language and Body’, p.97-8). 

To take another example besides pain as a point of comparison - a different, familiar example in our lives of concern we have regarding other minds - relates to what to accept under the name of love within our lives, with its promises and compromises, with its capacity to absorb and tame intensities. 

As the cases of the pain or love experienced by others reveal, 
“with respect to the external world, an initial sanity requires recognising that I cannot live my scepticism, whereas with respect to others a final sanity requires recognising that I can. I do.” (Claim of Reason, p.451). 

Cavell does not think that we can therefore escape scepticism regarding other minds: we simply cannot remove from our lives the issues that make us wonder about the minds of others, “problems of trust and betrayal, of false isolation and false company, of the desire and the fear of both privacy and union” (Claim of Reason, pp.453-4). 

Cavell argues that our knowledge of others is always subject to comparison, consciously or in phantasy, with an unreachable harmony, transparency, union. We wish for and fear the kind of acute and stable knowledge of others that we do have, to a large degree, about external objects. Against this idealised image, our actual successes at knowing or being known by others are broken, inadequate things.

As described in the previous section, in his autobiography Cavell gives an account of his early impression - or rationalisation perhaps - that it was his sense of distance from or ignorance of his father that was the cause of his father’s rage at him. In his philosophy, in the shadow of this early experience, Cavell emphasised that 
“in everyday life the lives of others are neither here nor there; they drift between their inexpressiveness and my inaccuracy in responding to them” (Claim, p.84). 

He expresses frustration, then, at the analytic philosophy of his day for making knowing others a procedural or methodological problem divorced from life. Analytic philosophy misrecognises as a problem of epistemological method the existential predicament that there are both painful and protective limits in what humans can show one another and what we can conceal about ourselves. The problem is not that we are distant knowers of the minds of others, but that in everyday life we worry about others as distant and/or overclose. In this way,
“philosophers deny how real the practical difficulty is of coming to know another person, and how little we can reveal of ourselves to another’s gaze, or bear of it” (Claim, p.91). 

Cavell aligns himself with the argument, proposed by object relations theory, that our minds and our lives are fully social from the beginning, though certainly spaces of isolation are subsequently made when others shut the door on us or we on them. To get the other fully out of us would require an exorcism. Even a coded, private diary or an internal conversation – as Wittgenstein (1953: §258) and Milner (1987) show – is prompted by the social and emotional terrain we share with others, with concepts invested by these encounters, and with effects on the self that we can sustain in future social interactions:
The extent to which we understand one another or ourselves is the same as the extent to which we share or understand forms of life, share and know, for example, what it is to take turns, to take chances, or know that some things we have lost we cannot look for but can nevertheless sometimes find or recover; share the sense of what is fun and what loss feels like, and take comfort from the same things and take confidence or offence in similar ways. (Themes out of School, p.223)

Given this, the problem of knowing others does not come from the need to bridge some great original separateness between human beings. It arises, Cavell argues, when we face others’ doubts and denials of us, in the regular situations that reveal that "my relations with others are restricted, that I cannot trust them blindly." (Claim of Reason, p.432). 

It is then that questions about the minds of others are ignited within us. Where our encounters with others are either i) superficial or ii) adequately trusting, the sceptical question simply does not arise with any traction. In Themes out of School, Cavell recalls how effective his father was at putting strangers at ease, with superficiality and trust supporting one another in achieving mutuality and convivial pleasure. In his interactions with strangers, Cavell’s father was able 
“to act on what nobody could fail to know, and to provide what nobody could fail to appreciate, even if in a given moment they could not return it. Call it sociability. At such a time I felt I would be happy to have my father as an acquaintance, to be treated by him to a serious regard, if somewhat external, for my comfort and opinion; to count not as an intimate but as an equal.” (Themes out of School, p.105)

Cavell observes that scepticism is sometimes framed as a kind of scrupulousness or precision, an attempt to ensure that we do not make mistakes when attempting to penetrate the minds of others. However, he suggests that this is a front, over-generalised from some very specific occasions like law courts where it might be pertinent. In truth, scepticism is generally motivated, he thinks, by experiences or worries about being disappointed and depleted by others in the context of our continual exposure to them. Influenced by Freud’s Psychopathology of Everyday Life, Cavell urges recognition that with every hesitation, with every gesture, we risk revealing things about our experience to others, and that this potential for revelation is beyond our capacity to fully control. While it is true that a great deal of our experience is generally only acknowledged by others when we speak of it, Cavell emphasises that there is nothing within us for which this is entirely true. 

Any aspect of our inner lives or past can threaten to be potentially available for exposure without our volition, depending on how our encounters with others go. Others may catch the direction of our gaze, discerning lines of desire or identification we had otherwise kept hidden. They may note the lines around our eyes that speak of waking early with anxiety and memories heavy upon us. They may see actually how much reassurance, even pleasure, we take from grumbling about the familiar things:
With each word we utter we emit stipulations, agreements we do not know and do not want to know we have entered, agreements we were always in, that were in effect before our participation in them. Our relation to our language - to the fact that we are subject to expression and comprehension, victims of meaning - is accordingly a key to our sense of our distance from our lives (Cavell, Quest of the Ordinary, p.40).

Most of the time, if we are in a state of comparative mental health, our inner lives are kept unavailable from one another, whether or not by conscious choice. We roll through life within the placeholders made available by convention, knowing one another well enough generally to muddle through, without demanding too much openness from ourselves or others except at circumscribed and ritualised moments (e.g. medical examination, religious confession, heart-to-heart conversation with a friend, pillow-talk with a lover). Cavell recalls learning about the role of these placeholders in puzzling about the behaviour of his parents, trying to understand:
“how these two human beings that I called my parents, who were capable of these intensities, had nevertheless come to their accustomed economy of life” (Pitch of Philosophy, p.48). 

We may be fearful that if we know others too well we will either be damaged by this or feel infinitely, unbearably responsible for making things right for them. It is hard not to be distrustful of the patience and inventiveness of others in their capacity to know us, and so hold back from letting them see those aspects of ourselves that we worry might create a bad impression. We may also doubt our ability to engage others, with anxiety about our inexpressiveness, or our capacity to deserve or sustain the other’s interest. These fears about being known by and knowing other people are not simply irrational: there may be very good, protective reasons for them. This point is well illustrated by findings by attachment researchers that an avoidant response to loved ones in the context of distress is especially common among those individuals who have learnt from experience to expect painful rebuff or excessive interference (Ainsworth et al. Patterns of Attachment; Mikulincer & Shaver, Attachment in Adulthood).

However, even in the context of avoidant strategies or the platitudes of everyday convention that keep others at bay, Cavell emphasises that there is always the potential for knowing others and for being known, beyond our intentions. In this, the present acts as the poorly sutured wound of the past, continually threatening to bleed through: 
“I cannot at will give my past expression, though every gesture expresses it, and each elation and headache; my character is its epitome, as if the present were a pantomime of ghostly selections” (Must We Mean: 295). 

It is for this reason that we cannot know ourselves alone. In Cavell’s view active conversation, with sufficient trust, is needed for us to truly learn from what we say and enactdo, as we live our inheritance in ways that exceed our intentions or ready ways of knowing ourselves. Without others engaging our actions with seriousness and patience, Cavell worries that we stand little chance of understanding our partly-willed orientation within the world, and to sense our own lives as morally intelligible. In his autobiographical account, Cavell’s experience of psychotherapy, of teaching, of (his second) marriage, of friendship and of being a parent to young children are each described as important sources of personal strength in his adult life, and provide him with the exemplary cases of this process of coming to know oneself in serious, patient dialogue. 

Table 1: Hoping and fearing knowing and being known

	We can know or learn about others	We will not know or learn about others
Hope that…	e.g. we might learn spontaneously when to be tender with a child or parent.	e.g. the child’s or parent’s love in which we find happiness and vitality is perceived by them as nothing special.
Fear that…	e.g. in knowing about the child/parent we will end up infinitely responsible for their needs and pain.	e.g. we will be exiled and cut off from any meaningful sense of community or belonging, left in isolation and abandonment by our child/parent.

	Others will know or learn about us	Others will not know or learn about us
Hope that…	e.g. that we might be recognised and acknowledged when we try to convey to others something about our life, so that their response is to us in some true sense, not just what we do in our role as a child/parent.	e.g. that our child/parent will not learn some of the private things we still despair at ourselves for having done in the past.
Fear that…	e.g. that our tone and gestures will betray us to the child’s/parent’s interest and insightfulness, revealing our contradictory or embarrassing commitments and wishes – even ones we don’t ourselves fully know.	e.g. that our words will be met with scorn or bafflement, due to the child’s/parent’s lack of understanding, patience, inventiveness, or interest.

NB. Hopes and fears about how a child or parent may know us can be about the same thing, for instance how much effort it can take for us to cope with and get through a day.


The problem of love

For Cavell, the problem that philosophy calls scepticism regarding other minds is, in fact, the substantive concern of our everyday lives, motivated by desires and fears about what our lives may hold. This is formulated by the philosophical tradition through questions such as “Is my pain the same as your pain?” However, one of Cavell’s most important insights is that the same issue of the intelligibility of others faced by philosophy is also one of the great animating topics of literature and film, as crystals in turn refracting the concerns of everyday life. Literature provides a space where we come to know ourselves and others, precisely though the way that literature traces the varied ways that knowledge of others is achieved or not achieved. Cavell’s son, Benjamin, in an interview about his collection of short stories Rumble, Young Man, Rumble, reports literature (and boxing, in fact) as a space of non-identification but of love and knowing in his relationship with his father: “I felt as though I couldn’t be a philosopher. What would be my dream? My dream would be to be my father in some way. And that didn’t appeal to me. Certainly, he influenced the way I thought about the world. I have always had this feeling for writing that I am sure is due in part to his influence and his love for writing and writers” (“Benjamin Cavell, Interview”). Unlike Stanley Cavell, who changed his name as one index of his disidentification with his father, Benjamin Cavell’s account seems to speak of a more negotiated position of dependence and independence. Rumble, Young Man, Rumble is a beautiful collection of stories about young masculinity and detachment as an achievement, training attention on the banter, boasting and anger used both to express and to mask desire for affection and to feel a little less lost in the world. 

In his own scholarship, Cavell finds in Shakespeare, like in no other writer, the most acute attention to a version of the sceptic’s doubt regarding the mind of the other: “How do I know that she loves me?”, perhaps alternately formulated as “Is she satisfied and is the satisfaction directed at me?”. Each tragedy holds this concern in a different way. Indeed, “a map of the territory of scepticism provides, or is, a map of Shakespearean regions” (Disowning Knowledge, p.19). Beginning perhaps with the simple wish to test a truth, the tragic hero pursues a line of doubt to the point of violence in response to a fear about his or her relationship with and vulnerability to others. Othello murders Desdemona in despair at finding evidence in the world that can prove conclusively that she loves him; the doubt is motivated ultimately by the fear that she might not, given that he has no idea why she actually came to love him in the first place. The same logic can be seen in The Winter’s Tale: in his doubt whether he is the father of Hermione’s child, Leontes ruins his family and harms his kingdom to the point that the miraculous happy ending to the play comes out of the blue and rings uncomfortably hollow. The insistent truth of the ghost of Hamlet’s father deprives the son of the chance to mourn, with the consequence that Hamlet is unable to enter into and trust life with others, and their interactions take on a skeletal or theatrical quality for him. 

In each case, tragedy arises from an individual unwilling to the point of violence to give up on doubts about others around him. Othello, Leontes and Hamlet hold a bar for acknowledgment so high that their real, everyday life cannot reach it, and for this reason they indict and destroy this life as sickening or worthless. This is the mythological quality of tragedy. It dramatises the consequences of a temptation common to all humans – but especially likely under conditions of disappointment or restlessness – to distrust the terms of our poor, ordinary mutual attunement and vulnerability to one another. In contrast to most humans, who have other options, a tragic hero is, for whatever reason, constituted in some indelible way that makes them unable to make sense of their relationships in terms other than doubt:
In normal periods, tragic acts are skirted by one’s cares remaining superficial enough or mutually compatible enough for them not to suffer naked exposure. In the typical situation of tragic heroes, time and space converge to a point at which an ultimate care is exposed and action must be taken which impales one’s life upon the founding care of that life – that in the loss of which chaos is come… That the love becomes incompatible with that life is tragic, but that it is maintained until the end is heroic. (Must We Mean, pp.349-50).

Our lives are generally superficial enough or mutually compatible enough that we do not come to exposure. And when we do, it often turns out that what is exposed is not something that cannot be altered, and tragedy averted. In drawing this conclusion, Cavell has a great sense of the malleability of human nature, and, following Freud, for him it is based ultimately in how they engage what history has made of their present. (Cavell’s debt to Freud in this regard is pervasive in his writings, but especially documented in his article “Freud and Philosophy”). For Cavell, sceptical doubt and failures to acknowledge others are not inevitable. They are formed by particular circumstances from childhood: 
“Men do not just naturally not love, they learn not to. And our lives begin by having to accept under the name of love whatever closeness is offered, and by then having to forgo its object.” (Must We Mean: 300). 

Despite his analysis of the theme of scepticism across Shakespeare’s tragedies in general, the central play for Cavell’s study of scepticism is Shakespeare’s King Lear. Fisher (2000: 977), writing in the International Journal of Psychoanalysis, has called Cavell’s work “one of the most penetrating essays on this play” across the long history of Shakespeare scholarship. In Cavell’s essay on Lear, the angry father, full of rage and incomprehension, is taken as the paradigm of the sceptical predicament. There is a limited sadness in the fact that this analysis, so laden with themes from Cavell’s childhood, would precisely have the greatest role to play of all his writings in catapulting him to international renown as a scholar, to the acknowledgement and respect from others his father yearned for and never received. But there is also a limited happiness in this as well, that through Cavell’s impassioned analysis of a father’s avoidance of acknowledgement a son would find a way beyond his father, never escaping the incinerating inheritance of his father’s rage entirely, but making headway.  

On Cavell’s interpretation, the opening scene of King Lear reveals the stakes of the play. Lear stages a ceremony, announcing that he will divide his realm among his three daughters, and that the largest share will go to the one who loves him the most. Goneril and Regan flatter their father, and receive a share of the inheritance. Cordelia, however, refuses to flatter Lear through public declaration of platitudes. Lear is enraged by this, and disinherits Cordelia. But what was Lear attempting to achieve with this ceremony? Why ask his daughters whether they love him, and why do so in public? Cavell suggests that, as King, Lear was unable to feel sure whether his daughters loved him for his power or out of attachment. Lear worried that without power, he would be unworthy of their love, and that increasing powerlessness was inevitable as he approached old age. The ceremony, on Cavell’s interpretation, was a strategy designed to avoid learning whether this fear was true. In “exchanging his fortune for his love at one swap” (Must We Mean, p. 289), Lear avoids the question of whether he was worthy of love by asking only for its public profession, nothing more genuine. In exchange, he offers his kingdom, but no true feeling of his own. However, Cordelia’s response threatens this defence: “Cordelia is alarming precisely because he knows she is offering the real thing, offering something a more opulent third of his kingdom cannot, must not, repay; putting a claim upon him he cannot face. She threatens to expose both his plan for returning false love with no love, and expose the necessity for that plan – his terror of being loved, of needing love.” (290) In hiding from our fears and wishes, Cavell argues, we hold on to doubts about ourselves and others, rather than allowing uncertainties to be worked out with others in the ordinary ways humans can go adventuring and getting matters done with one another. 

The raging incomprehension of Lear, like Cavell’s father, make him a hard act to follow, casting a great shadow across his children. Rage does so in part by taking those that feel it away from the ordinary space of mutual attunement and change, where things can remain either superficial enough or mutually compatible enough that we can be together without the need to doubt one another beyond what the relationship can sustain. In considering the role of rage in this regard, it is uncomfortable but helpful to imagine what it would have been like for Cavell’s father, forced to acknowledge or not acknowledge his son’s thinking and accomplishments. One clue to what it was like for Cavell’s father is given in the book on Shakespeare where Cavell reports that his father joked that, rather than a student of philosophy, his son must be a researcher in chemistry. Otherwise how could it be that he was able to turn tuition money into shit? (Disowning Knowledge, p.172). Yet another clue lies in the father’s offer to pay to have Cavell fitted in the Harvard PhD robes. The fitting allowed father and son to symbolise the way that each had overshadowed the other, and nonetheless claim kinship and attachment and a certain need for one another. Such demonstrations of believing in one another and of returning the other’s love are complex and indirect, but achievable and real. The autobiographical scene of the robe fitting stands in contrast to the ceremony that begins King Lear, which Cavell interprets precisely as a way of avoiding acknowledgement of the wish to be loved. In his angry doubts about his own value and that of his loved ones, together with his occasional attempts to do better, Cavell’s father is less a tragic hero of the consistent and brutal Shakespearean type than one aspect of the ordinary family member each of us remains.
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